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Abstract We examine the basic question of whether pressure is stressful. We propose that
when examining the role of stress or pressure in cognitive performance it is important to
consider the type of pressure, the stress response, and the aspect of cognition assessed. In
Experiment 1, outcome pressure was not experienced as stressful but did lead to impaired
performance on a rule-based (RB) category learning task and not a more procedural
information-integration (II) task. In Experiment 2, the addition of monitoring pressure resulted in
a modest stress response to combined pressure and impairment on both tasks. Across
experiments, higher stress appraisals were associated with decreased performance on the RB,
but not the II, task. In turn, higher stress-reactivity (heart rate) was associated with enhanced
performance on the II, but not the RB, task. This work represents an initial step towards
integrating the stress-cognition and pressure-cognition literatures and suggests that integrating
these fields may require consideration of the type of pressure, the stress-response, and the
cognitive system mediating performance.
Key words: Pressure, Stress, Category Learning, Cognition

Introduction

What is pressure?

From family life to social life to work life,
pressure and stress are so ubiquitous in
modern life that it is no surprise that
psychologists have taken great interest in the
impact of pressure and stress on cognitive
performance. Although pressure-cognition
and
stress-cognition
research
have
proceeded somewhat independently, it is
quite common to assume that pressure is
stressful (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Masters,
1992; Staal, 2004). Despite the face validity of
this assumption, there have been few direct
tests of this prediction. This question is
particularly important in light of recent studies
demonstrating that cognitive performance can
vary as a function of the pressure
manipulation (DeCaro et al., 2011) and the
stress response (e.g., Ell et al., 2011). In the
current research, we take an initial step
towards integrating pressure and stress
research by examining whether pressure is
experienced as stressful.

Individuals experience pressure when they
must perform to their potential in order to
achieve a goal (Baumeister, 1984). This type
of outcome pressure is often induced by
increasing the difficulty of reaching some goal
and/or providing an incentive that is
contingent
on
performance.
Outcome
pressure is thought to co-opt working memory
and attentional resources, resulting in
impairment in cognitive tasks dependent on
these processes (Beilock & Carr, 2005; Lewis
& Linder, 1997; Markman et al., 2006).
Pressure may also be induced by social
evaluation or social monitoring (e.g., an
evaluative other present and/or videotaping
for later evaluation - DeCaro, et al., 2011;
Gimmig et al., 2006). Monitoring pressure, in
contrast, is more likely to encourage selfmonitoring of task performance than to co-opt
working memory and attentional resources,
resulting in impairment in cognitive tasks
dependent
on
procedural
knowledge
(DeCaro, et al., 2011). Consistent with these
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predictions, outcome pressure has been
shown to impair performance on cognitive
tasks dependent on working memory, and
monitoring pressure impairs performance on
more procedural cognitive tasks (e.g. Decaro,
et al., 2011). Importantly, however, many
pressure situations are multifaceted including
both aspects of outcome and monitoring
pressure. Such combined pressure situations
have been argued to negatively impact
performance on both working-memory
dependent
and
procedural-knowledge
dependent tasks, although this prediction has
yet to be tested (DeCaro, et al., 2011).
What is Stress?
As with pressure, stress is a multifaceted
construct. Variability exists in individual
responses to potential stressors (i.e. events,
situations). Individuals experience more
distress when the perceived demands of a
situation exceed their resources to cope (e.g.
Lazarus & Folkman, 1994). Higher levels of
distress are marked by the psychological
experience of threat, and activation of both
the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and
the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis (HPA)
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Dienstbier,
1989; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lupien et
al., 2007; McEwen & Sapolsky, 1995). When,
however, individuals perceive adequate
resources to cope with the demands of the
situation, they may experience less distress
(e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
Stressors that exhibit the most robust
stress responses in the lab involve
performance situations in which individuals
are evaluated by others in a domain of
personal importance, and in which they are
motivated to do well (Blascovich & Tomaka,
1996; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Such
social-evaluative stressors share elements of
both outcome pressure and monitoring
pressure and, like pressure, have been
shown to impair cognitive performance
depending upon an individual’s stress
response (Ell, et al., 2011; Kassam et al.,
2009; Payne et al., 2007). While a distress
response is commonly associated with
negative cognitive task performance, it may

facilitate performance on more procedural
cognitive tasks that are less dependent on
working memory and attentional resources
(e.g. Ell, et al., 2011). For example, distress
has been shown to impair working memory
and attentional control (e.g., Plessow et al.,
2012; Schoofs et al., 2008) but also to bias
processing toward procedural knowledge
(Schwabe & Wolf, 2012). These effects may
be due in part to the “neuro-symphony” of
neurotransmitters
and
stress
steroids
released in the stress response (e.g.
norepinephrine and cortisol; Joels & Baram,
2009). In contrast to pressure research in
which it is the variability in the pressure
situation (outcome, monitoring, combined)
that is argued to be of critical import to
understanding the consequences of pressure
for cognition, the consequences of a stressor
on cognition have been argued to depend
critically on variability in the stress response.
The Current Investigation: Is Pressure
Stressful?
Many manipulations intended to increase
pressure, particularly monitoring pressure
manipulations, include characteristics that
might be expected to lead to a stress
response. Indeed, the words pressure and
stress are sometimes used interchangeably in
the literature (e.g., Beilock & DeCaro, 2007;
DeCaro, et al., 2011; Staal, 2004). We
propose that integrating the pressurecognition and stress-cognition literatures may
require consideration of the type of pressure,
the stress response, and the cognitive system
mediating task performance.
As a model task, we focus on category
learning (i.e. the process of establishing a
memory trace that improves the efficiency of
assigning novel objects to different groups).
Category learning has attracted the interest of
both pressure-cognition researchers (DeCaro,
et al., 2011; Markman, et al., 2006; Worthy et
al., 2009) and stress-cognition researchers
(Ell, et al., 2011; Schwabe & Wolf, 2012),
making it a particularly useful paradigm given
our goals. Moreover, there is extensive
evidence suggesting that processing can be
biased towards different cognitive systems by
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the categorization response) is
assessed (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). In
particular, we focus on the rule-based
(RB) and information-integration (II)
tasks plotted in Figure 1. RB and II
tasks are argued to be probes for
different category learning systems
that compete and vary in their
dependence on working memory and
attentional resources (with RB tasks
Figure 1. Scatterplots of the stimuli from the rule-based
being more dependent - Ashby et al.,
and information-integration tasks. The unfilled circles
1998; Ashby & Ell, 2001; Ashby &
represent category A stimuli, the filled circles represent
Maddox, 2005; but see Lewandowsky
category B stimuli, and the solid lines are the optimal
et al., 2012). For example, Markman
decision boundaries.
and colleagues (Markman, et al.,
2006) trained participants on the
pressure
would
negatively
impact
Figure 1 tasks under low (i.e., participants
performance in both RB and II tasks
were instructed to do their best) or high
Ell and colleagues (Ell et al. 2011)
outcome pressure (i.e., participants were led
investigated the impact of a social-evaluative
to believe that their performance would
stressor on the subsequent performance in
determine if they, and a fictitious partner,
the RB and II tasks depicted in Figure 1. The
would earn a monetary bonus). Consistent
social-evaluative stressor was adapted from
with the aforementioned research suggesting
the classic Trier Social Stress Test (TSST,
that outcome pressure co-opts working
Kirschbaum et al., 1993) which contains
memory and attentional resources, and the
strong elements of both outcome and
assumption of competition between category
monitoring pressure (in addition to uncertainty
learning systems, high outcome pressure
and ego relevance elements). In contrast to
impaired performance on the RB task and
the pressure manipulations described above,
enhanced performance on the II task.
and in common with many investigations of
DeCaro and colleagues (DeCaro et al.,
the role of stress in cognition, this stressor
2011) extended this work and tested the
occurred prior to the learning tasks (offline)
hypothesis that the effect of pressure on
and was not directly relevant to task
performance in these cognitive tasks is also
performance yet participants’ stress remained
dependent on the type of pressure. Using a
elevated into the learning period. Ell et al.
different set of RB and II tasks (i.e., stimuli
(2011) found that increased distress
varying along 4, binary-valued dimensions),
enhanced performance on the II task and
DeCaro and colleagues (2011) replicated the
tended
to
decrease
(although
not
impairing effect of outcome pressure on an
significantly) performance on the RB task.
RB task, but observed no effect of outcome
Moreover, distress was associated with
pressure on an II task. Monitoring pressure, in
increased use of a task appropriate II decision
contrast, is argued to impair procedural tasks
strategy in the II task suggesting a bias away
– tasks that are thought to be more sensitive
from rule-guided behavior.
to the effects of self-awareness and selfThus, RB and II categorization tasks have
monitoring. Consistent with this pressure-type
been studied in the context of both pressure
hypothesis, DeCaro and colleagues found
and stress and have yielded mixed results,
that
monitoring
pressure
impaired
particularly for performance in II tasks. To
performance on an II, and not an RB, task.
begin to integrate the pressure-cognition and
Although combined pressure, or pressure that
stress-cognition literatures in this area it is
contains elements of both outcome and
first necessary to answer the basic question
monitoring pressure, was not investigated,
of whether pressure is stressful. In two
DeCaro and colleagues argued that combined
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experiments, we test the basic question of
whether pressure is experienced as stressful
(Experiment 1, outcome pressure; Experiment
2,
combined
pressure),
and
the
consequences
of
this
pressure
for
performance in RB and II tasks.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we replicated Markman et al.
(2006) while recording markers of the stress
response (i.e. distress appraisals, heart rate,
blood pressure). We first examined whether
the outcome pressure manipulation was
experienced by participants as stressful. We
then tested the hypothesis that outcome
pressure would impair performance in the RB
task and not impair performance on the II task
(due to absence of monitoring pressure;
DeCaro et al., 2011) or even enhance
performance on the II task (due to
competition; Markman, et al., 2006). Finally, a
stress-variability perspective (Ell et al, 2011)
would predict enhancement of II only to the
extent that outcome pressure is distressing.
Method
Participants and Design
Undergraduates (N = 116) with normal
(20/20) or corrected to normal vision
participated in a one hour session in
exchange for course credit. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four
experimental conditions (RB-low pressure =
23; RB-high pressure = 36; II-low pressure =
20; II-high pressure = 35). One participant
was excluded from the RB-low pressure
condition because they used only one
response key throughout the experiment.
Task and Procedure.
All methods and procedures specific to the
category learning tasks replicated Markman,
et al. (2006) with one exception. As the
impairing/enhancing effects of outcome
pressure were evident across the initial 5
blocks in Markman et al., participants were
trained on either the RB or II task for only 5,
instead of 8, blocks of 80 trials. The stimuli
were sine-wave gratings weighted by a

circular Gaussian filter that varied across trials
in spatial frequency (cycles/degree of visual
angle) and orientation (degrees of rotation
counterclockwise from horizontal). On each
trial, a single stimulus was presented and the
participant was instructed to make a category
assignment by pressing one of two response
keys (labeled “A” or “B”) with the index and
middle fingers of their dominant hand (blood
pressure measurements were taken from their
non-dominant arm). There was no time limit
for response and corrective feedback was
provided immediately after each response
(i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”). Two points were
added to a point meter on the monitor
following correct responses, but there was no
change
in points
following incorrect
responses. The stimuli were generated and
presented using the Psychophysics Toolbox
extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) for
MATLAB. The stimuli were displayed on a 17”
LCD with 1280 × 1024 resolution in a dimly lit
room.
Participants in the low outcome pressure
condition were instructed to do their best.
Participants in the high outcome pressure
condition were instructed that they and a
(fictional) partner would receive a monetary
bonus if they both exceeded a performance
criterion of 128 points (i.e., 80% correct) at
the end of training and that their partner had
met this criterion. Thus, earning the monetary
bonus depended solely on the participant’s
performance. Participants were reminded of
these instructions at the beginning of the final
block. The performance criterion (128 points)
was indicated by a line on the point meter.
Distress Appraisal.
Following the task, participants were asked to
rate the extent to which they found the task
stressful, demanding, effortful, and distressing
on a 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much) scale. The
responses were averaged to form a reliable
index of distress ( = .82).
Physical Reactivity.
Upon
arrival,
sensors
to
monitor
cardiovascular and hemodynamic reactivity
were applied (ECG: electrocardiogram, BP:
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continual blood pressure). Participants then
relaxed for a 5 min baseline. HR and MAP
were recorded using BioPac MP150 hardware
and BioPac Acquire software. Data were

monetary bonus was contingent upon
performance during the final block, pressure
would be expected to be at its peak during the
beginning of this block. Reactivity scores were
computed by subtracting baseline from this
peak level. Thus, positive/negative numbers
indicate a rise/decline in HR or MAP.
Results
Is Outcome Pressure Stressful?
Distress Appraisals Participants did not find
the outcome pressure particularly distressing
as all participants reported levels well below
the midpoint of the scale (High pressure: MRB
= 2.10, SDRB = 1.26, MII = 1.26, SDII = 1.10;
Low pressure: MRB= 2.07, SDRB = .91, MII =
1.26, SDII = 1.10). Further, a 2(task) by
2(pressure) ANOVA revealed no effect of
outcome pressure on distress (F(1,106) =
2.62, p = .11, p2 = .02) nor an interaction,
F(1,106) = 2.15, p = .12, p2 = .03. There was
an effect of task with participants rating the
RB task slightly more distressing than the II
task, F(1,106) = 4.18, p = .04, p2 = .04.

Figure 2. Average physiological
reactivity at the beginning of the final
block during Experiment 1 for HR
(heart rate: beats/minute) and MAP
(mean arterial pressure: mm Hg) as
a function of the categorization task
and pressure condition.

ensemble averaged over relevant minutes
using Mindware software. We calculated
average heart rate (HR, beats per minute)
and mean arterial pressure
during baseline (last 2
min, most relaxed) and the final block of trials
(first 2 min, highest pressure)1. As earning the

Physiological Reactivity Consistent with the
low levels of distress, participants did not
evidence physical reactivity to outcome
pressure (see Figure 2). Importantly, there
were no significant differences by pressure
condition in baseline HR (all Fs < 1, ps > .40)
or baseline MAP (all Fs < 2.34, ps >.13). No
effects of pressure condition, task or the
interaction were observed for HR reactivity (all
Fs < 1.20, all ps > .27). Although there was a
significant effect of pressure condition on
MAP reactivity F(1,86) = 7.12, p < .05, p2 =
.08), this effect was not a result of increased
MAP in the high pressure condition (see
Figure 2). No other effects were observed for
MAP (Fs < .30, ps > .55)2.

cardiovascular responses recover relatively quickly from stress
(Linden et al., 1997).
2

1

We focus on the first 2 min of the final block to equate the
time interval used for baseline measurements and because

Note that the degrees of freedom for our physiological
measures fluctuate slightly as a result of missing or unscorable
data due to equipment issues (RB-low pressure = 4; RB-high
pressure = 6; II-low pressure = 2; II-high pressure = 6).
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Does Outcome Pressure Impair Cognitive
Performance?
Accuracy
Analyses
Consistent
with
predictions, outcome pressure significantly
impaired accuracy in the RB task (see Figure
3). We examined the effect of pressure by
block separately for each task condition (with
block
as
the
within-subjects
factor,
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected for violation of
sphericity). As is evident in Figure 3,
participants in all conditions improved in
accuracy
over
blocks
(RB
block:
2
F(2.65,148.55) = 39.92, p <.05, p = .42; II
block: F(3.10,164.06) = 30.98, p < .05, p2 =
.01).
Outcome
pressure
only
negatively
impacted performance in the RB task (RB
pressure: F(1,56) = 5.96, p < .05, p2 = .10; II
pressure: F(1,53) = .69, p = .41, p2 = .01)
and this effect was consistent across blocks
(RB block x pressure: F(2.65, 148.55) = .65, p
= .57, p2 = .01; II block x pressure:
F(3.10,164.06), p = .71, p2 = .01). Consistent
with a pressure-type perspective, (DeCaro et
al., 2011) performance on the II task was not
impaired. There was no evidence of
enhancement of II performance in the high
outcome pressure condition.
Model-Based Analyses Analysis of the
accuracy data does not directly address the
question of what decision strategies were
used to perform the categorization tasks. For
instance, does the impairment in the RB task
reflect a shift to a less optimal decision
strategy or an increase in guessing? The
following analysis represents a quantitative
approach to investigating these questions.
Three different types of models were
evaluated, each based on a different
assumption concerning the participant's
strategy. Rule-based models assume that the
participant sets decision criteria on one (or
both) stimulus dimensions (e.g., if the bars
are wide, respond A; otherwise respond B).
Information-integration models assume that
the participant integrates the stimulus
information from both dimensions prior to
making a categorization decision. Finally,
random responder models assume that the

participant guessed. Each of these models
was fit separately to the data from every
response block for all participants using a
standard maximum likelihood procedure for
parameter
estimation
(Ashby,
1992b;
Wickens, 1982) and the Bayes information

Figure 3. Average accuracy across blocks in
Experiment 1 as a function of the
categorization task and pressure condition.

criterion for goodness-of-fit (Schwarz, 1978)
(see Appendix A for a more detailed
description of the models and fitting
procedure).
For brevity, we focus on the results from
the final block (Table 1). In the RB task, there
was a reduction in the dominance of RB
strategies (and increase in guessing) in the
high pressure condition, but this shift in the
distribution of best-fitting models was not
significant [χ2 (2) = 2.49, p = .29].
Nevertheless, the increase in guessing likely
contributed to the reduced accuracy in the
RB-high pressure condition as the subset of
participants best fit by RR models (M = 55.83,
SD = 4.42) performed much worse than those
best fit by RB models (M = 82.14, SD = 6.85)
or II models (M = 76.67, SD = 6.88). In the II
task, pressure had little effect on the
distribution of best fitting strategies [χ2 (2) =
.51, p = .78]. In sum, pressure was neither
psychologically nor physiologically stressful,
but consistent with previous work, pressure
impaired performance on a RB task.
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Table 1. Proportion of participants best fit by each model type during the final block
Model Type
Condition

RB

II

RR

RB: Low Pressure

.82

.09

.09

RB: High Outcome Pressure

.67

.08

.25

II: Low Pressure

.30

.45

.25

II: High Outcome Pressure

.31

.51

.17

Note. RB – rule based; II – information integration; RR – random responder. The II:
High Pressure data do not sum to 1 due to rounding error.
Discussion
Our data suggest that the answer to the basic
question of whether outcome pressure is
stressful is: No. At the group level,
participants did not find outcome pressure to
be
psychologically
or
physiologically
distressing. Consistent with DeCaro and
colleagues
(2011),
outcome
pressure
impaired performance in the RB task and did
not impair performance in the II task.
Collectively, these data are most consistent
with the hypothesis that outcome pressure coopts working memory and attentional
resources, leading to selective impairment in
the RB task. It may be the case that higher
levels of distress are required to evidence the
enhancement of II performance demonstrated
by Ell et al. (2011) Thus, in Experiment 2 we
augment our outcome pressure with
monitoring pressure in an effort to increase
distress and to test the hypotheses for
combined pressure set forth by DeCaro et al.
(2011) (i.e. impairment in both II and RB
tasks).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we tested predictions
regarding the consequences of combined

pressure for stress reactivity and cognitive
performance. To create our combined
pressure condition, we augmented the
outcome
pressure
manipulation
from
Markman et al. (2006) with monitoring
pressure by adding elements of social
evaluation. Social evaluation is a key
component
of
many
classic
stress
manipulations (see Dickerson & Kemeny,
2004 for a review) and may lead to greater
stress reactivity than outcome pressure alone.
In addition we examined the theoretical
predictions from DeCaro et al. (2011) that
combined pressure would impair performance
on both RB and II tasks.
Method
Participants and Design
Undergraduates (N =103; normal or corrected
to normal vision) participating for course credit
were randomly assigned to one of the four
experimental conditions (RB, low pressure =
28; RB, high combined pressure = 26; II, low
pressure = 23; II, high combined pressure =
26). 3
3

Due to equipment and computer issues we have missing data
for both the categorization task (II-low pressure = 1; II-high
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Task and Procedure
The tasks and procedure were identical to
Experiment 1 with the exception that
participants in the high combined pressure
condition experienced monitoring pressure in
addition to outcome pressure. To subtly
heighten social evaluation, participants
engaged in a brief interaction over an
intercom with the fictional partner. Following
the task instructions, participants introduced

themselves to their partner over an intercom.
The partner then stated, “I did meet the
criterion, so it is all up to you…good luck.”
The experimenter reinforced the social
evaluation of the partner by stating,
“Remember, you will have a chance to
discuss your performance with your partner
afterward” (see Appendix B for the full script).
Participants in the low pressure condition
were simply asked to do their best. Physical
reactivity and distress appraisals ( = .78)
were measured as described in Experiment 1.
Results
Is Combined Pressure Stressful?
Distress Appraisal While participants in the
high combined pressure condition (Mhigh =
2.29, SDhigh = 1.23) reported significantly
higher distress appraisals than participants in
the low pressure condition (Mlow = 1.71, SDlow
= 1.23; F(1,98) = 5.82, p < .05, p2 = .06), it
should be noted that as in Experiment 1,
distress remained below the midpoint of the
scale. We observed no effect of task (F(1,98)
= 1.23, p = .27, p2 = .01) nor of the
interaction (F(1,98) = 3.34, p = .07, p2 = .03).

Figure
4.
Average
physiological
reactivity at the beginning of the final
block during Experiment 2 for HR (heart
rate: beats/minute) and MAP (mean
arterial pressure: mm Hg) as a function
of the categorization task and pressure
condition.
pressure = 1), and the physiological markers (RB-low pressure
= 1; RB-high pressure = 1; II-high pressure = 1).

Physiological Reactivity Adding the subtle
manipulation of monitoring pressure to the
outcome pressure from Experiment 1 resulted
in a modest, but significant, increase in HR
and MAP relative to both baseline and the low
pressure condition (see Figure 4). Importantly,
no significant differences in MAP or HR were
observed at baseline, although the effect of
pressure condition approached significance
for HR (F(1, 85) = 3.33, p = .07, p2 = .04; all
other Fs < 1.54, ps > .21).
The addition of monitoring pressure to the
outcome pressure used in Experiment 1
resulted in significant main effects of pressure
for both HR reactivity (F(1, 85) = 13.18, p <
.05, p2 = .13) and MAP reactivity (F(1, 84) =
9.34, p < .05, p2 = .10). Moreover, the
modest increase in HR and MAP observed in
the combined pressure conditions was
significantly different from baseline (0; HR: t
(42) = 6.34, p < .05, d = 1.96; MAP: t (43) =
6.44, p < .05, d =1.96). While the interaction
approached significance for MAP (F(1, 84) =

STRESS, PRESSURE, AND COGNITION

Table 2. Proportion of participants best fit by each model type during the final block
Model Type
Condition

RB

II

RR

RB: Low Pressure

.75

.11

.14

RB: High Combined Pressure

.62

.12

.27

II: Low Pressure

.45

.50

.05

II: High Combined Pressure

.40

.20

.40

Note. RB – rule based; II – information integration; RR – random responder. The
RB: Combined Pressure data do not sum to 1 due to rounding error.

3.69, p = .06, p2 = .04), no significant effect of
task, or moderation by task, was observed (Fs
< 2.14, ps > .14). Thus, adding a subtle
manipulation of monitoring pressure to the
outcome pressure from Experiment 1 resulted
in a modest, but significant, increase in HR
and MAP relative to both baseline and low
pressure.

.02).
Model-Based Analyses In order to investigate
any differences in the decision strategies
used by participants, the models described in
Experiment 1 were also fit to these data. For

Does Outcome Pressure Impair Cognitive
Performance?
Accuracy
Analyses
Consistent
with
predictions from DeCaro et al. (2011),
combined pressure impaired performance on
both the RB and II tasks (see Figure 5). As in
Experiment 1, participants in all conditions
improved their accuracy over blocks (RB:
F(2.88, 149.73) = 50.79, p <.05, p2 = .49; II
F(3.27, 147.31) = 24.02, p <.05, p2 = .35).
Participants under high combined pressure
evidenced significantly lower performance in
the RB (F(1,52) = 4.84, p < .05, p2 = .09) and
II tasks (F(1,45) = 8.36, p < .05, p2 = .16)
relative to the low pressure condition; and
these effects were not moderated by block
(RB: F(2.88, 149.73) = .59, p = .68, p2 =
.009; II: F(3.27, 147.31) = 1.08, p = .36, p2 =

Figure 5. Average accuracy across blocks
in Experiment 2 as a function of the
categorization task and pressure condition.
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brevity, we focus on the results from the final
block (Table 2). In both tasks, there was an
increase in the dominance of guessing
models in the combined pressure condition.
Although the difference in the distribution of
best fitting models between pressure
conditions was statistically significant in only
the II task [RB: χ2 (2) = 1.42, p = .49; II: χ2 (2)
= 9.46, p < .05], the increase in guessing
likely contributed to the pressure impairment
in both tasks as the subset of participants
best fit by RR models (MRB task = 52.68, SDRB
task = 3.78; MII task = 53.75, SDII task = 5.59)
performed much worse than those best fit by
RB models (MRB task = 81.48, SDRB task = 8.96
or II models (MII task = 70.25, SDII task = 3.47).
Is Distress Associated with Cognitive
Performance at These More Modest Levels?
Previous
work
has
demonstrated
enhancement of performance in an II task
with higher levels of distress (Ell, et al., 2011).
As shown in Figure 6, the stress reactivity in
the
combined
pressure
condition
of
Experiment 2 is orders of magnitude lower
than that observed in the social- evaluative
stressor used by Ell et al. at peak stress (i.e.,
a modified version of the TSST; reactivity
continued into the learning period in Ell et al.)
4
.
It is important to note, however, that
although all participants faced the same
social evaluative stressor in Ell et al., there
was considerable individual variability in
stress
reactivity.
The
more
distress
participant’s evidenced, the higher their II
performance and the lower their RB
performance (although the RB effects were
not significant). Thus, while there may be
mean differences in reactivity by pressure
condition in Experiment 2, we would not
expect the relationship between reactivity and
cognitive performance to differ by pressure
condition or Experiment. Accordingly, we

examined the relationships between distress
(appraisals, HR reactivity, and MAP reactivity)
and cognitive performance within each task
condition collapsed across condition and
experiment5.
While the level of distress in the current
studies was more modest than observed in Ell
et al., the more distress participants reported
the lower their accuracy in the RB task (r(110)
= -.47, p < .001) but not the II task (r(100) = .15, p = .17). This impairment effect was
replicated when examining the point biserial
correlation between task appropriate strategy
use (appropriate vs. inappropriate; see
Appendix A) and reported distress. The more
distress participants reported, the less likely
participants were to use task appropriate rule
based strategies in the RB task (r(110) = -.42,
p <.001). In contrast, distress did not predict
appropriate use of II strategies in the II task,
r(100) = -.04, p = .67. Consistent with the
perspective that distress may enhance II
performance, even at this modest level of
distress higher heart rate reactivity was
associated with better accuracy in the II task
(r(86) = .29, p < .01) but not the RB task (r(91)
= .16, p = .13). This pattern of enhancement
in the II task was also evident in the
association between heart rate reactivity and
the use of task appropriate strategies (rII(86) =
.25, p < .05; rRB(91) = .02, p = .88). No effects
were observed for blood pressure reactivity at
these modest levels of distress (Accuracy:
rII(83) = .06, p =.57; rRB(93) = .16, p = .11;
Appropriate Strategy Use: rII(83) = .15, p =.17;
rRB(93) = .02, p = .85).
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we added monitoring
pressure
to
the
outcome
pressure
manipulation used by Markman et al., 2006.
The addition of social evaluation did indeed
raise the intensity of the stress response.
5

4

As expected, physiological reactivity varied across the three
experiments plotted in Figure 6 for both physiological variables
2
[HR: F(2,130) = 47.65, p < .05, p = .42; MAP: F(2,132) =
2
202.95, p < .05, p = .26]. In general, post hoc analyses
(Student-Newman-Keuls) indicated that physiological reactivity
was ordered from highest-to-lowest as described in Figure 6
(p’s < .05) with the one exception being the HR difference for
the present experiments (p = .06).

We first used moderated regression to examine whether the
effects of distress on performance within each task were
moderated by experiment and pressure condition. They were
not. All relevant interaction terms [e.g. Distress Marker
(centered at the mean) X Task (0 = II) X Experiment (0 =
Experiment 1) X Pressure Condition (0 = low pressure)] were
not significant using either accuracy or strategy use as an
outcome variable and heart rate, appraisals, or blood pressure
as the distress marker.
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While more modest than the stress response
observed in Ell et al. (2011; see Figure 6),
participants did perceive the combined
pressure as more distressing and reported
higher HR and MAP reactivity relative to the
control condition.
Consistent with the
theorizing of DeCaro and colleagues (2011),
combined pressure impaired both RB and II
tasks relative to the control condition. The
addition of monitoring pressure to the
outcome manipulation from Experiment 1 led
to an impairment of II performance that was
not evident with outcome pressure alone.
Model based analyses suggest that this
impairment may be due to an increase in
random responding in the II task under
combined pressure.
We also found mixed evidence for the
relationships between distress and task
performance at these modest levels of stress
reactivity. As hypothesized, accuracy and
appropriate strategy use in RB tasks were
impaired by distress – but only self-reported
distress.
In
contrast,
accuracy
and
appropriate strategy use in II tasks were
enhanced by distress – but only as marked by
heart rate reactivity.
General Discussion
The current research represents a modest
first step toward integrating the pressurecognition and stress-cognition literatures. We
believe the concepts of pressure, stress and
cognition to be multifaceted. When examining
the effects of a stressor on cognitive
performance it is important to consider the
type
of
pressure
exerted
(outcome,
monitoring, or combined), stress reactivity and
the cognitive system mediating task
performance. As an initial step toward
examining these broader questions, we first
addressed the basic question of whether
pressure is indeed stressful. Across two
experiments, we examined the stress
response to common pressure manipulations,
and the consequences for categorization

tasks thought to depend on different learning
systems.
Is Pressure Stressful?
In Experiment 1, we found that outcome
pressure was not experienced by participants
as stressful. This is particularly important for
future attempts at reconciling stress-cognition
and pressure-cognition findings as the terms
“stress” and “pressure” are often conflated in
the literature. In Experiment 2, the addition of
a very subtle manipulation of social evaluation
increased monitoring pressure and resulted in
significant, but modest, stress reactivity to this
combined pressure. Participants reported
significantly higher heart rate reactivity, blood
pressure reactivity and distress appraisals in
the combined pressure condition relative to
the low pressure condition. As noted in
Figure6, however, this stress response was
substantially lower than that observed by Ell
et al. (2011). As we work toward integrating
the stress cognition and pressure cognition
literatures, it may be important to distinguish
when, and to what degree, pressure is
experienced as distressing.
Does
Pressure
Performance?

Impair

Cognitive

Consistent with the findings from DeCaro et
al. (2011) and Markman et al. (2006),
outcome pressure and combined pressure
impaired performance on the category
learning task thought to be more dependent
upon working memory and attentional
resources (i.e., a RB task). These data are
consistent with the hypothesis that outcome
pressure serves as a distraction/divides
attention, impairing performance on tasks
dependent on working memory. Indeed, this
may explain why participants tended to
engage in more random responding in the RB
task in the high pressure conditions relative to
the no pressure conditions, although this
effect was not significant in either study.
Our findings for the effects of pressure on
II task performance were consistent with the
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theorizing and findings of DeCaro et al., 2011.
Outcome pressure did not impair performance
on a more procedural-based category
learning task (i.e., an II task). Combined
pressure, in contrast, led to impairments in
accuracy and more random responding in the
II task relative to the control condition,
arguably due to increased self awareness
resulting from monitoring (DeCaro et al.,
2011).
We did not find that outcome pressure
enhanced II performance, contrary to the
findings of Markman et al (2006). As the
prominent theoretical perspective on the
learning of RB and II tasks (Ashby, et al.,
1998) does not distinguish between types of
pressure, the consequences of adding
monitoring pressure (combined pressure) to
the predictions of Markman et al are unclear.
If adding monitoring pressure is perceived as
simply increasing the intensity of the
pressure, perhaps enhancement on the II task
might have been expected. There is no easy
explanation for our failure to replicate the
enhancement observed by Markman et al.
Perhaps the participants in Markman et al.
found the outcome pressure more distressing
than our participants (i.e. higher levels of
distress
may
be
associated
with
enhancement of II; Ell et. al., 2011).
Distress and Cognitive Performance: More
Questions than Answers?
How do the current findings relate to those
observed by Ell and colleagues (2011)? Ell
and colleagues found that distress enhanced
performance on an II task. For both accuracy
and appropriate strategy use, the higher
participants distress (i.e. appraisals, total
peripheral resistance, cardiac output) the
better their II performance. We did not
observe enhanced II performance in the only
condition that evidenced significant stress
reactivity above baseline: combined pressure.
Yet, from the stress-variability perspective of
Ell et al., individuals vary in their response to
pressure and it is those that respond with
higher levels of distress (regardless of
pressure condition) that may evidence
enhanced II performance.

Figure 6. Average physiological
reactivity and distress appraisals
from the high pressure conditions
(averaged
across
tasks)
of
Experiment 1 (E1), Experiment 2
(E2) and the final two min. of a
modified version of the TSST that
was administered in Ell et al. (2011).
HR (heart rate: beats per minute)
and MAP (mean arterial pressure:
mm Hg).

Accordingly, we analyzed the associations
between our markers of stress reactivity and
task performance collapsed across condition
and experiment. Our results were mixed.
Consistent with the findings that Ell et al.
observed with different distress markers,
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higher levels of heart rate reactivity were
associated with greater accuracy, as well as,
more appropriate strategy use in the II task
but not in the RB task. It is particularly
intriguing to observe this association at these
lower levels of stress reactivity when behavior
is often unassociated with reactivity (Lupien,
et al., 2007; Roozendaal, 2002). Indeed, II
and RB task performance were unassociated
with blood pressure reactivity. In contrast to
the physical distress variable predictive of II
performance, RB performance was related to
the self-report marker of distress. The more
participants reported feeling that the task was
stressful, effortful, demanding and distressing
the lower their accuracy and appropriate
strategy use in the RB task. Self-reported
distress was unrelated to performance in the
II task.
Reconciling the current mixed findings
with Ell et al is further complicated by
differences in the levels of participants’ stress
reactivity.
While distress rose with the
addition of monitoring pressure in Experiment
2, as can be seen in Figure 6 distress
reactivity was more modest than that
observed in Ell et al. In addition to aspects of
outcome and monitoring pressure the TSST
incorporates a number of other factors that
are associated with a more robust stress
response (e.g., uncontrollability - Dickerson &
Kemeny, 2004). Further the TSST is a 20 min
social evaluative stressor developed to
activate the Hypothalimic Pituitary Adrenal
Axis (HPA) and measurable increases in
cortisol (Kirschbaum, et al., 1993). Although
combined pressure resulted in significant
increases for both MAP and HR (relative to
baseline), these effects were relatively
modest when compared to those observed
with the TSST. Thus, it may be that consistent
associations between stress reactivity and
task performance are more evident with
higher levels of reactivity.
Yet, while the mixed findings between
distress reactivity and performance could be
due to the lower intensity of the response,
there are other important factors to consider.
Our analyses assume a linear relationship
between distress and cognitive performance.
It is conceivable that this relationship could

vary across levels of distress. Certainly the
“neuro-symphony” (Joels & Baram, 2009) of
the stress response is likely to vary (e.g.
cortisol more evident at higher levels of
intensity). A broader representation of data
across the continuum of the stress response
would help clarify whether the relationship
between distress and cognitive performance
in the RB and II tasks is non-linear.
In addition, there is considerable
methodological diversity in the way in which
pressure has been implemented in the
laboratory setting. Some researchers have
simply used time pressure or performance
bonuses whereas others have incorporated a
social-evaluative component (see Staal, 2004
for a review). In addition, pressure
manipulations are typically administered
online (i.e., the pressure manipulation and
task are concurrent) and often the
manipulation is directly relevant to the task at
hand (i.e., partner’s bonus contingent on
participant’s performance). This stands in
contrast to the majority of stress-cognition
research that uses offline stressors (i.e., the
stressor precedes the task but reactivity may
remain high during the task as in Ell et al.,
2011), stressors unrelated to the cognitive
task (e.g., cold pressor; Smeets et al., 2008),
and/or more intense prolonged stressors
known to activate a cortisol response (i.e.
TSST). These differences in method may
stem from differences in the proposed
mediators of the role of pressure and stress in
cognitive performance. Much of the pressure
literature posits cognitive explanations while
in contrast much of the stress literature posits
more biological ones. Our findings may raise
more questions than answers – but they are
important questions for future work integrating
the stress cognition and pressure cognition
literatures. Our data suggest that research
examining factors related to the intensity, task
relevance,
type
(outcome,
monitoring,
combined), and timing (online vs. offline) of
stressors/pressure manipulations is needed.
Conclusions
The goal of this research was to take an initial
modest step towards integrating the pressure-
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cognition and stress-cognition literatures.
While the terms pressure and stress are often
used interchangeably in the literature, our
data suggest that there are important
distinctions: Pressure is not always stressful.
Our findings regarding task performance
support the hypotheses of DeCaro et al.
demonstrating that differentiating pressure
type may be important for understanding the
relationship
between
pressure
and
performance in cognitive tasks dependent on
different learning systems. Outcome pressure
is assumed to impact cognitive performance
by co-opting working memory and attentional
resources thereby impairing performance on
tasks dependent upon executive control
processes. Monitoring pressure, in contrast, is
assumed to increase awareness of the subcomponents of tasks thereby impairing
performance on more procedural tasks. In our
experiments, outcome pressure selectively
impaired performance on the RB task, while
the addition of monitoring pressure led to
impairment in both RB and II tasks. This latter
finding is novel and contributes to our
understanding of the role of combined
pressure in cognitive performance. These
data also contribute to the growing
appreciation in both the stress-cognition and
pressure-cognition literatures of distinguishing
the cognitive system mediating task
performance
when
considering
the
consequences of pressure or stress. While
our findings for the role of distress in cognitive
performance were less clear at the low levels
of reactivity observed, including the
measurement of the physiological stress
response in future studies of the pressurecognition relationship will be critical in
elucidating this relationship given the possible
interplay between stress-response variability
and the cognitive systems mediating task
performance.
Appendix A: Model-Based Analyses
To get a more detailed description of how
participants categorized the stimuli, a number
of different decision bound models (Ashby,
1992a; Maddox & Ashby, 1993) were fit
separately to the data for each participant
from every block. Decision bound models are

derived from general recognition theory
(Ashby & Townsend, 1986), a multivariate
generalization of signal detection theory
(Green & Swets, 1966). It is assumed that, on
each trial, the percept can be represented as
a point in a multidimensional psychological
space and that each participant constructs a
decision bound to partition the perceptual
space into response regions. The participant
determines which region the percept is in, and
then makes the corresponding response.
While this decision strategy is deterministic,
decision bound models predict probabilistic
responding because of trial-by-trial perceptual
and criterial noise (Ashby & Lee, 1993).
The appendix briefly describes the
decision bound models. For more details, see
Ashby (1992a) or Maddox and Ashby (1993).
The classification of these models as either
rule-based or information-integration models
is designed to reflect current theories of how
these strategies are learned (e.g., Ashby, et
al., 1998) and has received considerable
empirical support (see Ashby & Maddox,
2005; Maddox & Ashby, 2004 for reviews).
Rule-Based Models
Unidimensional Classifier (UC) This model
assumes that the stimulus space is
partitioned into two regions by setting a
criterion on one of the stimulus dimensions.
Two versions of the UC were fit to these data.
One version assumes that participants
attended selectively to spatial frequency and
the other version assumes participants
attended selectively to orientation. The UC
has two free parameters, one corresponds to
the decision criterion on the attended
dimension and the other corresponds to the
variance of internal (perceptual and criterial)
noise ( ). A special case of the UC, the
Optimal Unidimensional Classifier, assumes
that participants use the unidimensional
decision bound that maximizes accuracy. This
special case has one free parameter ( )
Conjunctive Classifier (CC) An alternative
rule-based strategy is a conjunction rule
involving separate decisions about the
stimulus value on the two dimensions with the
response assignment based on the outcome
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of these two decisions (Ashby & Gott, 1988).
The CC assumes that the participant
partitions the stimulus space into four regions.
Based on an initial inspection of the data, two
versions of the CC were fit to these data. One
version assumes that individuals assigned a
stimulus to category B if it was high on spatial
frequency and low on orientation (i.e., the
bars are thin and shallow); otherwise the
stimulus would be assigned to category A.
The other version assumes that individuals
assigned a stimulus to category A if it was low
on spatial frequency and high on orientation
(i.e., the bars are thick and steep); otherwise
the stimulus would be assigned to category B.
The CC has three free parameters: the
decision criteria on the two dimensions and a
common value of
for the two dimensions.
Information-Integration Models
The Linear Classifier (LC) This model
assumes that a linear decision bound
partitions the stimulus space into two regions.
The LC differs from the CC in that the LC
does not assume decisional selectiveattention (Ashby & Townsend, 1986). This
produces an information-integration decision
strategy because it requires linear integration
of the perceived values on the stimulus
dimensions. The LC has three parameters,
slope and intercept of the linear bound, and
.
The Minimum Distance Classifier (MDC). This
model assumes that there are a number of
units representing a low-resolution map of the
stimulus space (Ashby & Waldron, 1999;
Ashby et al., 2001; Maddox et al., 2004). On
each trial, the participant determines which
unit is closest to the perceived stimulus and
produces the associated response. The
version of the MDC tested here assumes two
units because the category structures were
generated from two multivariate normal
distributions. Because the location of one of
the units can be fixed, and because a uniform
expansion or contraction of the space will not
affect the location of the minimum-distance
decision bounds, the MDC has four free
parameters (three determining the location of
the units and ).

Random Responder Models
Equal Response Frequency (ERF) This model
assumes that participants randomly assign
stimuli to the two response frequencies in a
manner that preserves the category base
rates (i.e., 50% of the stimuli in each
category). This model has no free
parameters.
Biased Response Frequency (BRF) This
model assumes that participants randomly
assign stimuli to the two response
frequencies in a manner that matches the
participant’s
categorization
response
frequencies (i.e., the percentage of stimuli in
each category is computed from the observed
response frequencies). This model has no
free parameters. Although the ERF and BRF
are assumed to be consistent with guessing,
these models would also likely provide the
best account of participants that frequently
shift to very different strategies.
Model Fitting
The model parameters were estimated using
maximum likelihood (Ashby, 1992b; Wickens,
1982) and the goodness-of-fit statistic was
BIC = r lnN - 2lnL,
where N is the sample size, r is the number of
free parameters, and L is the likelihood of the
model given the data (Schwarz, 1978). The
BIC statistic penalizes a model for poor fit and
for extra free parameters. To find the best
model among a set of competitors, one simply
computes a BIC value for each model, and
then chooses the model with the smallest
BIC. For data analysis purposes, the bestfitting models were classified as being task
appropriate or not. For the RB task, the UC
models were task appropriate. For the II task,
the LC and MDC were task appropriate.
Appendix B: Experiment 2 Script
The participant was informed of the name of
their fictitious partner just prior to interacting
with the fictitious partner via an intercom
system. The fictitious partner (Jen or John)
and the participant were matched on gender.
Below is an example for a female participant.

STRESS, PRESSURE, AND COGNITION

Experimenter
(speaking
into
the
intercom): Ok, Jen go ahead and introduce
yourself to your partner.
Fictitious Partner (recording played over
the intercom): Hi my name is Jen, nice to
meet you.
Experimenter
(speaking
to
the
participant): Now go ahead and introduce
yourself to Jen.
… After the participant responds…
Experimenter
(speaking
into
the
intercom): Jen, do you have anything you
would like to tell your partner about the task?
Fictitious Partner (recording played over
the intercom): Umm…no not really. Except…I
did meet the criterion, so it is all up to
you…good luck.
Experimenter
(speaking
to
the
participant): Great. Now that you have been
introduced, let’s get started. Remember, you
will have a chance to discuss your
performance with your partner afterward. The
computer will reiterate many of the directions I
have discussed with you, so if you have any
questions feel free to speak up. Also, the
computer will remind you of your partner’s
performance throughout the task, so when
you get to the final block you will know how
well you need to perform.
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